,Technological advances will have a significant impact on future crises. Decision-making will become more difficult and complex as the amount of information available to decision-makers and the public increases substantially. Photos from commercial satellites have just begun to have an effect on governments and their policies. The rapid increase in technology will provide capabilities to the news media that will profoundly affect the relationship among the media, military and national leaders. The old ways of doing business have changed. The launching of a media satellite is certain to raise many issues that must be addressed and solved. The media's use of their own satellite will generate conflicts between first amendment rights and U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. A ,mediasat-, will also affect military strategy and tactics. This paper addresses these issues in a hypothetical scenario in an attempt to generate awareness of potential problems and postulate some solutions.
SCENARIO 1999
It was the worst crisis since WW11. The world was in a state of chaos. Uncertainty ,fear and tension gripped the world. The purpose of this paper is to address the potential effects of information obtained by commercial satellites on decision making during a national crisis. Effects on government and military decision-makers will be examined from a historical standpoint as well as in a hypothetical scenario. Even though the U.S. media industry has begun to speculate on the potential political, ethical and philosophical impact of their increasing satellite-based power to gather information and shape world opinion, our national military leadership has to date shown little interest in the matter.
We will begin with a look at the situation as it exists today:
What constitutes a "crisis"? How could media-controlled satellites influence a crisis? What legal issues are unresolved regarding these satellites? These will be examined and discussed. The paper will then discuss the technology available today and predict its future development. It will examine how these capabilities will affect the media and the military. Finally I hope to provide some possible solutions to this problem. If we do not address these problems today, they will be more difficult to resolve in the future when we are in the midst of a crisis. Hopefully, we can break the tradition of waiting for events to occur before we decide to take actions that would have influenced them to our advantage if taken earlier.
THE SITUATION: 1989
The accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the characteristics. As the situation unfolds there appears to be a unique structure to the policy making group that is involved in the decision-making. Surely, numerous dramatic terms like "ambiguous,"
"unexpected," "dangerous," and "fast-breaking," serve to describe a typical crisis. In fact, there is a wealth of written material regarding crises and decision making, yet there are few clear cut prescriptions for managing crises. However, according to Michael Nacht, certain criteria tend to differentiate a crisis from "business as usual.":
1.
Key decision-makers believe that time is short. Then the decision maker concludes that the situation is so urgent that his attention to it cannot be diverted from it, so it takes precedence over all other concerns. 4. A small number of players tend to assume responsibility for evaluating on-going events. In a crisis, decision making and access to information tends to be centralized in a small group. The normal bureaucracy is too large and cumbersome to cope with a time sensitive crisis.
5.
There is a strong sense that decisions arrived at during a crisis will carry great significance. The players think that the decisions made will have significant short and long-term importance. Precedents will be set which will influence diplomatic relationships and the prestige of the country. The state of affairs will be forever changed. Future events will be influenced by decisions made during the crisis.I
Most of these characteristics have been evident in the crises that the U.S. has dealt with during the past two decades. There is no reason to believe that future crises will be any different.
The duration of a crisis will determine the impact that commercial satellites will have on the situation. Generally, the longer the crisis,the larger the impact that information from commercial sources will have on the decision making process.
However, a brief crisis could still be subject to intense outside influence. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis is generally considered to be a short crisis since it took place over a thirteen day period. certainly cannot assume that all "outsiders" will possess friendly motives; in fact, some will most likely be enemies. The sheer volume of information will also complicate the process and make it difficult to separate the critical elements of information, and focus on substantiated data.
In the U.S., issues such as freedom of the press, first amendment rights, and executive-congressional relations could collide with national security considerations. Thus, substantial legal and even moral issues would be joined with major foreign policy considerations. 4 It is obvious that a crisis situation is ripe for exploitation by those who possess satellite photos. Technological advances will increase even further the impact that satellites will have on a crisis. World-wide value added companies will purchase data from the media and develop uses that are totally unforeseen at this time.
TECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND FUTURE
Congressmen Robert Walker (Rep., Pennsylvania) and George Brown, A third concern of the report has already been discussed: the potential for losing control during a crisis. The fourth concern was the fear that these satellites might provide valuable intelligence to third parties.
The final concern was the danger of media misinterpretation of data.! Too many of the press became critics and analysts. They were more interested in their own agenda than the truth.
The military was frustrated. Too much control and guidance was coming from Washington. It seemed that the administration was becoming paralyzed because of its inability to make decisions. In the war zone U.S. commanders were also surrounded by the media.
It finally became obvious to U.S. strategists that the war on the TV screens must be played by the military. Castro and Ortega needed to be countered. U.S. commanders, from the lowest level up to the generals, were being interviewed on TV. Initially, they had complained about the media and the way they were handling the information that satellites brought them. They thought that the media was publishing information that made it difficult to achieve tactical surprise and deception. They didn't like seeing the enemy commanders on TV so often, because it eroded public support and Was there a doctrine for this kind of warfare?
The questions and concerns that arise regarding the impact that mediasats might have on the battlefield are almost endless.
I've mentioned a few. The challenge is to prepare ourselves ahead of time so that we don't discover this "new" battlefield too late!
The year 1999 must not find us unprepared.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The issues raised by this study seem to increase every time If we can recognize future problems, are there some things we can do to prevent them? The answer to this is obviously yes, to some degree. But we must remember that there are genuine differences of perspective and roles regarding the military and the media. Understanding and appreciating these differences is the key for both sides. The solutions may not be perfect and agreement may be difficult, but it would be irresponsible to ignore the problem.
In order to solve some of the problems discussed we should focus our efforts in two general areas. First, the training that the military conducts must prepare leaders to operate in a mediasat environment. Secondly, the military and the media need to work harder at gaining a better understanding of each other. Training in military educational institutions and in the field must emphasize the importance of the image that leaders will portray.
We must be historians who understand not only the successful tactics of previous battles but the mental edge that commanders can achieve over the enemy. Understanding the nature of psychological warfare in a world-wide information glut is essential. Intelligence sources must provide in-depth information on how the enemy leaders think and speak in public. These will be important consideration when developing strategy for the battlefield and on the TV screen.
Politically astute, intelligent officers who can quickly adapt to the pressures of the media and the enemy on live TV will have an edge. The commander who recognizes the importance of public opinion and considers it in his tactics will reap rewards.
The importance of Public Affairs Officers(PAO's) will increase significantly. While they have always been important, they will take on critical roles in the future. Their skills and relationship with the media will be extremely important. PAO's must be chosen wisely. They must be trained to operate and understand the ramifications of technology and its impact on tactics, decisionmaking and reporting. PAO's must be visible and involved in providing input to operational plans. Commanders, however, must recognize that the most effective PAO is the commander himself.
For some, it may be easy to dismiss the notion that military officers will find themselves involved in fighting a war and appearing on TV opposite the enemy. I believe it would be foolhardy to do so. How do we handle the information that the mediasat will provide? This is the toughest question. Somehow we need to develop some rules.
I believe it is in everyone's best interest to achieve a "compact" between the media and the military. This compact would identify selected areas or subjects that both sides agree would gravely harm military operations if published. Both sides must seek confidence with the other. These rules may always be in a state of flux and may never produce total agreement. Yet we need a start-up point. The key is that both sides work together. If this process breaks down, 1999 will be a disaster. The military-media discussion cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Leaders in government, business, and education must help stimulate debate in various forums on the serious issues that will arise. A thoughtful, futuristic analysis of the implications of commercial satellites in the next ten years is needed before we stumble through future crises. We need to proceed with awareness and intelligence as we adjust to the capabilities and problems that technology will provide to those involved in a crisis.
According to Mark Brender, ABC News, Washington D.C. the following list comprises some of the uses of remote sensing imagery by the media: -In April 1985, ABC News used Landsat imagery of the Iran-Irag border.
-On January 22,1986, ABC News used imagery of a military airfield and surface to air missile sites in Libya.
-On February 21, 1986, ABC News broadcast Landsat imagery of a naval facility at Murmansk in the Soviet Union.
-In April and May 1986, SPOT and Landsat imagery of Chernobyl was used by all the major networks and newspapers.
-On July 4, 1986, ABC News used SPOT imagery of New York harbor for part of the network's "Liberty Weekend" coverage.
-On August 4, 1986 ABC,CBS and CNN used SPOT imagery of the Soviet nuclear testing facility at Semipalantinsk. The story was reported without imagery by the New York Times.
-On August 25, 1986 ABC aired SPOT imagery of the Soviet space launch complex at Tyuratum and the New York Times published a story using the imagery.
-In its October 1986 issue,National Geographic Magazine used SPOT imagery of the Soviet cosmodromes at Plesetsk and Baikonur.
-On October 16, 1986, Swedish television used SPOT imagery in a story on Soviet submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula. 
